Empathy bodyssence: temporal dynamics of sensorimotor and physiological responses and the subjective experience in synchrony with the other's suffering.

Background: Empathy is foundational in our intersubjective interactions, connecting with others across bodily, emotional, and cognitive dimensions. Previous evidence suggests that observing individuals in painful situations elicits whole bodily responses, unveiling the interdependence of the body and empathy. Although the role of the body has been extensively described, the temporal structure of bodily responses and its association with the comprehension of subjective experiences remain unclear. Objective: Building upon the enactive approach, our study introduces and examines "bodyssence," a neologism formed from "body" and "essence." Our primary goal is to analyze the temporal dynamics, physiological, and phenomenological elements in synchrony with the experiences of sportspersons suffering physical accidents. Methods: Using the empirical 5E approach, a refinement of Varela's neurophenomenological program, we integrated both objective third-person measurements (postural sway, electrodermal response, and heart rate) and first-person descriptions (phenomenological data). Thirty-five participants watched videos of sportspersons experiencing physical accidents during extreme sports practice, as well as neutral videos, while standing on a force platform and wearing electrodermal and heart electrodes. Subsequently, micro-phenomenological interviews were conducted. Results: Bodyssence is composed of three distinct temporal dynamics. Forefeel marks the commencement phase, encapsulating the body's pre-reflective consciousness as participants anticipate impending physical accidents involving extreme sportspersons, manifested through minimal postural movement and high heart rate. Fullfeel, capturing the zenith of empathetic engagement, is defined by profound negative emotions, and significant bodily and kinesthetic sensations, with this stage notably featuring an increase in postural movement alongside a reduction in heart rate. In the Reliefeel phase, participants report a decrease in emotional intensity, feeling a sense of relief, as their postural control starts to reach a state of equilibrium, and heart rate remaining low. Throughout these phases, the level of electrodermal activity consistently remains high. Conclusion: This study through an enactive approach elucidates the temporal attunement of bodily experience to the pain experienced by others. The integration of both first and third-person perspectives through an empirical 5E approach reveals the intricate nature of bodyssence, offering an innovative approach to understanding the dynamic nature of empathy.

Bounded rationality, enactive problem solving, and the neuroscience of social interaction.

This article aims to show that there is an alternative way to explain human action with respect to the bottlenecks of the psychology of decision making. The empirical study of human behaviour from mid-20th century to date has mainly developed by looking at a normative model of decision making. In particular Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) decision making, which stems from the subjective expected utility theory of Savage (1954) that itself extended the analysis by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). On this view, the cognitive psychology of decision making precisely reflects the conceptual structure of formal decision theory. This article shows that there is an alternative way to understand decision making by recovering Newell and Simon's account of problem solving, developed in the framework of bounded rationality, and inserting it into the more recent research program of embodied cognition. Herbert Simon emphasized the importance of problem solving and differentiated it from decision making, which he considered a phase downstream of the former. Moreover according to Simon the centre of gravity of the rationality of the action lies in the ability to adapt. And the centre of gravity of adaptation is not so much in the internal environment of the actor as in the pragmatic external environment. The behaviour adapts to external purposes and reveals those characteristics of the system that limit its adaptation. According to Simon (1981), in fact, environmental feedback is the most effective factor in modelling human actions in solving a problem. In addition, his notion of problem space signifies the possible situations to be searched in order to find that situation which corresponds to the solution. Using the language of embodied cognition, the notion of problem space is about the possible solutions that are enacted in relation to environmental affordances. The correspondence between action and the solution of a problem conceptually bypasses the analytic phase of the decision and limits the role of symbolic representation. In solving any problem, the search for the solution corresponds to acting in ways that involve recursive feedback processes leading up to the final action. From this point of view, the new term enactive problem solving summarizes this fusion between bounded and embodied cognition. That problem solving involves bounded cognition means that it is through the problem solver's enactive interaction with environmental affordances, and especially social affordances that it is possible to construct the processes required for arriving at a solution. Lastly the concept of enactive problem solving is also able to explain the mechanisms underlying the adaptive heuristics of rational ecology. Its adaptive function is effective both in practical and motor tasks as well as in abstract and symbolic ones.

From autopoiesis to self-optimization: Toward an enactive model of biological regulation.

The theory of autopoiesis has been influential in many areas of theoretical biology, especially in the fields of artificial life and origins of life. However, it has not managed to productively connect with mainstream biology, partly for theoretical reasons, but arguably mainly because deriving specific working hypotheses has been challenging. The theory has recently undergone significant conceptual development in the enactive approach to life and mind. Hidden complexity in the original conception of autopoiesis has been explicated in the service of other operationalizable concepts related to self-individuation: precariousness, adaptivity, and agency. Here we advance these developments by highlighting the interplay of these concepts with considerations from thermodynamics: reversibility, irreversibility, and path-dependence. We interpret this interplay in terms of the self-optimization model, and present modeling results that illustrate how these minimal conditions enable a system to re-organize itself such that it tends toward coordinated constraint satisfaction at the system level. Although the model is still very abstract, these results point in a direction where the enactive approach could productively connect with cell biology.

Cartography of the multiple formal systems of molecular autopoiesis: from the biology of cognition and enaction to anticipation and active inference.

A rich literature has grown up over the years that bears with autopoiesis, which tends to assume that it is a model, a theory, a principle, a definition of life, a property, refers to self-organization or even to hastily conclude that it is hylomorphic, hylozoist, in need of reformulation or to be overcome, making its status even more unclear. Maturana insists that autopoiesis is none of these and rather it is the causal organization of living systems as natural systems (NS) such that when it stops, they die. He calls this molecular autopoiesis (MA), which comprises two domains of existence: that of the self-producing organization (self-fabrication) and that of the structural coupling/enaction (cognition). Like all-NS in the universe, MA is amenable to be defined in theoretical terms, i.e. encoded in mathematical models and/or formal systems (FS). Framing the multiple formal systems of autopoiesis (FSA) into the Rosen's modeling relation (a process of bringing into equivalence the causality of NS and the inferential rules of FS), allows a classification of FSA into analytical categories, most importantly Turing machine (algorithmic) vs non-Turing machine (non-algorithmic) based, and FSA with a purely reactive mathematical image as cybernetic systems, i.e. feedbacks based, or conversely, as anticipatory systems making active inferences. It is thus the intent of the present work to advance the precision with which different FS may be observed to comply (preserve correspondence) with MA in its worldly state as a NS. The modeling relation between MA and the range of FS proposed as potentially illuminating their processes forecloses the applicability of Turing-based algorithmic computational models. This outcome indicates that MA, as modelled through Varela's calculus of self-reference or more especially through Rosen's (M,R)-system, is essentially anticipatory without violating structural determinism nor causality whatsoever, hence enaction may involve it. This quality may capture a fundamentally different mode of being in living systems as opposed to mechanical-computational systems. Implications in different fields of biology from the origin of life to planetary biology as well as in cognitive science and artificial intelligence are of interest.

Not in the drug, not in the brain: Causality in psychedelic experiences from an enactive perspective.

Psychedelics are psychoactive substances that receive renewed interest from science and society. Increasing empirical evidence shows that the effects of psychedelics are associated with alterations in biochemical processes, brain activity, and lived experience. Still, how these different levels relate remains subject to debate. The current literature presents two influential views on the relationship between the psychedelic molecule, neural events, and experience: The integration view and the pluralistic view. The main aim of this article is to contribute a promising complementary view by re-evaluating the psychedelic molecule-brain-experience relationship from an enactive perspective. We approach this aim via the following main research questions: (1) What is the causal relationship between the psychedelic drug and brain activity? (2) What is the causal relationship between brain activity and the psychedelic experience? In exploring the first research question, we apply the concept of autonomy to the psychedelic molecule-brain relationship. In exploring the second research question, we apply the concept of dynamic co-emergence to the psychedelic brain-experience relationship. Addressing these two research questions from an enactive position offers a perspective that emphasizes interdependence and circular causality on multiple levels. This enactive perspective not only supports the pluralistic view but enriches it through a principled account of how multi-layered processes come to interact. This renders the enactive view a promising contribution to questions around causality in the therapeutic effects of psychedelics with important implications for psychedelic therapy and psychedelic research.

Corrigendum: Bringing forth within: Enhabiting at the intersection between enaction and ecological psychology.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01348.].

Voluntary self-initiation of the stimuli onset improves working memory and accelerates visual and attentional processing.

The ability of an organism to voluntarily control the stimuli onset modulates perceptual and attentional functions. Since stimulus encoding is an essential component of working memory (WM), we conjectured that controlling the initiation of the perceptual process would positively modulate WM. To corroborate this proposition, we tested twenty-five healthy subjects in a modified-Sternberg WM task under three stimuli presentation conditions: an automatic presentation of the stimuli, a self-initiated presentation of the stimuli (through a button press), and a self-initiated presentation with random-delay stimuli onset. Concurrently, we recorded the subjects' electroencephalographic signals during WM encoding. We found that the self-initiated condition was associated with better WM accuracy, and earlier latencies of N1, P2 and P3 evoked potential components representing visual, attentional and mental review of the stimuli processes, respectively. Our work demonstrates that self-initiated stimuli enhance WM performance and accelerate early visual and attentional processes deployed during WM encoding. We also found that self-initiated stimuli correlate with an increased attentional state compared to the other two conditions, suggesting a role for temporal stimuli predictability. Our study remarks on the relevance of self-control of the stimuli onset in sensory, attentional and memory updating processing for WM.

From analytic to synthetic-organizational pluralisms: A pluralistic enactive psychiatry.

Introduction: Reliance on sole reductionism, whether explanatory, methodological or ontological, is difficult to support in clinical psychiatry. Rather, psychiatry is challenged by a plurality of approaches. There exist multiple legitimate ways of understanding human functionality and disorder, i.e., different systems of representation, different tools, different methodologies and objectives. Pluralistic frameworks have been presented through which the multiplicity of approaches in psychiatry can be understood. In parallel of these frameworks, an enactive approach for psychiatry has been proposed. In this paper, we consider the relationships between the different kinds of pluralistic frameworks and this enactive approach for psychiatry. Methods: We compare the enactive approach in psychiatry with wider analytical forms of pluralism. Results: On one side, the enactive framework anchored both in cognitive sciences, theory of dynamic systems, systems biology, and phenomenology, has recently been proposed as an answer to the challenge of an integrative psychiatry. On the other side, two forms of explanatory pluralisms can be described: a non-integrative pluralism and an integrative pluralism. The first is tolerant, it examines the coexistence of different potentially incompatible or untranslatable systems in the scientific or clinical landscape. The second is integrative and proposes to bring together the different levels of understanding and systems of representations. We propose that enactivism is inherently a form of integrative pluralism, but it is at the same time a component of the general framework of explanatory pluralism, composed of a set of so-called analytical approaches. Conclusions: A significant number of mental health professionals are already accepting the variety of clinical and scientific approaches. In this way, a rigorous understanding of the theoretical positioning of psychiatric actors seems necessary to promote quality clinical practice. The study of entanglements between an analytical pluralism and a synthetic-organizational enactivist pluralism could prove fruitful.

COVID-19 in the United States as affective frame.

In this paper I attempt to contribute to the developing field of "political philosophy of mind." To render concrete the notion of "affective frame," a social situation which pre-selects for salience and valence of environmental factors relative to a subject's life, I conduct a case study of a deleterious socially instituted affective frame, which, during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, produced individuated circumstances that came crashing down on "essential workers" who were forced into a double bind. We saw here an untenable and ultimately fatal situation that forced a choice between, on the one hand, increasing the risk of their failing to provide financial support for their family if they quit their job or reduced their hours, and on the other, increasing their risk of contracting the virus by continuing to work. The case study will thus be itself an affective frame that will bring to the fore for its readers a nexus of harmful social practices of contemporary American society. Form is reinforced by content here, as this particular affective frame brings forth a further emphasis on affect when we focus on workers simultaneously socialized into roles as breadwinners and as members of the caring professions. For those people, quitting work becomes even more difficult as they come to affirm their self-identity of being providers of affective labor for those in their care at work and of being the affective anchor of family life at home, the one who financially helps keep a roof over the heads of their loved ones as well as being the emotional backbone of the family. Hence the affective frame of "essential workers in Covid times" renders salient and affirmatively valenced their affectively laden self-image as caring helpers of those in need, at home and at work.

Language and Intelligence: A Relationship Supporting the Embodied Cognition Hypothesis.

Cognitive science has gathered robust evidence supporting the hypothesis that cognitive processes do not occur in an amodal format but take shape through the activation of the sensorimotor systems of the agent body, which works as simulation system upon which concepts, words, and thought are based. However, studies that have investigated the relationship between language and cognitive processes, as both embedded processes, are very rare. In this study, we investigated the hypothesis that intelligence is associated with referential competence, conceived as the ability to find words to refer to our subjective and perceptual experience, and to evoke understanding of this experience in the listener. We administered the WAIS-IV test to 32 nonclinical subjects and collected autobiographical narratives from them through the Relationship Anecdotes Paradigm Interview. The narratives were analyzed linguistically by applying computerized measures of referential competence. Intelligence scores were found to correlate with the use in narratives of words related to somatic and sensory sensations, while they were not associated with other measures of referential competence related to more abstract domains of experience or based on vivid or reflective dimensions of language style. The results support the hypothesis that sensorimotor schemas have an intrinsic role in language and cognition.

Navigating in the Gray Area of Coach-Athlete Relationships in Sports: Toward an In-depth Analysis of the Dynamics of Athlete Maltreatment Experiences.

Several studies have revealed the abusive behaviors directed against athletes in various sports contexts, but knowledge about the processes by which the athletes realize and accept or reject maltreatment is underdeveloped. Thus, it is difficult to establish a solid scientific basis for characterizing the mechanisms of maltreatment from the athletes' perspective regarding the forms of maltreatment they endure and the impact on their performance and wellbeing. The main goals of this paper are to show how the enactive approach (including theoretical assumptions and methodological standards) can meet these challenges, as it is well-suited to (a) describe the evolving interactions between athletes and the sports situations that lead to maltreatment (i.e., navigating in the gray area of coach-athlete relationships), (b) identify those alert landmarks that help us assess the level of risk of athlete maltreatment, and (c) provide concrete guidelines to prevent and deal with sports-related maltreatment. We illustrate our approach by a case study that examines the experience of a retired high-level boxer who faced several forms of maltreatment. Our results reveal a dynamic change in the interactions between the boxer and the maltreatment situations that led her through (a) Acceptance (i.e., future-oriented positive involvement), (b) Regulation attempt (i.e., negative feelings about weight loss, exhaustion and loneliness, questioning the compromise between performance and health, acceptance and loneliness), (c) Distancing (i.e., reopening to others) and (d) Rejection (i.e., rebellion and the decision to stand up to her coach and leave). Based on our results, we present concrete guidelines to prevent and address sports-related maltreatment, with four progressive alert landmarks that help situate the athlete in the gray area of coach-athlete relationships and suggest a "timeline" of maltreatment escalation with key warnings.

Knowing the Knowing. Non-dual Meditative Practice From an Enactive Perspective.

Within a variety of contemplative traditions, non-dual-oriented practices were developed to evoke an experiential shift into a mode of experiencing in which the cognitive structures of self-other and subject-object subside. These practices serve to de-reify the enactment of an observing witness which is usually experienced as separate from the objects of awareness. While several contemplative traditions, such as Zen, Mahamudra, Dzogchen, and Advaita Vedanta emphasize the importance of such a non-dual insight for the cultivation of genuine wellbeing, only very few attempts in contemplative science have turned toward the study of non-dual-oriented practices. This article starts from a recently developed theoretical cognitive science framework that models the requirements of a temporary experiential shift into a mode of experiencing free from cognitive subject-object structure. This model inspired by the enactive approach contributes theoretically grounded hypotheses for the much-needed rigorous study of non-dual practices and non-dual experiences. To do so, three steps are taken: first, common elements of non-dual-oriented practices are outlined. Second, the main ideas of enactive cognitive science are presented including a principled theoretical model of what is required for a shift to a pure non-dual experience, that is, an experiential mode that is unbound by subject-object duality. Third, this synthesized theoretical model of the requirements for the recognition of the non-dual is then compared with a specific non-dual style of meditation practice, namely, Mahamudra practice from Tibetan Buddhism. This third step represents a heuristic for evaluating the external coherence of the presented model. With this, the aim is to point toward a principled enactive view of non-dual meditative practice. In drawing the implications of the presented model, this article ends with an outlook toward next steps for further developing a research agenda that may fully address the concrete elements of non-dual practices.

Enacting Gender: An Enactive-Ecological Account of Gender and Its Fluidity.

This paper aims to show that genders are enacted, by providing an account of how an individual can be said to enact a gender and explaining how, consequently, genders can be fluid. On the enactive-ecological view we defend, individuals first and foremost perceive the world as fields of affordances, that is, structured sets of action possibilities. Fields of natural affordances offer action possibilities because of the natural properties of organisms and environments. Handles offer graspability to humans because of physical-structural properties of handles and the anatomical-physiological properties of humans. Although humans live in fields of bodily, action, and cultural affordances, our work focuses on cultural affordances, where action possibilities are offered to individuals because of the normative responses of individuals in that culture. Knocking on a door affords entrance because knocking provides cultured individuals on the other side of the door an affordance to which they themselves behave normatively. Usually, behaving normatively in response to cultural affordances brings about sequences of perception-action loops, which we will call "scripts": for instance, closed doors afford knocking, which affords the individual inside opening the door, which affords an interpersonal meeting, which (may) afford entrance. Although the notion of script has a strong cognitivist flavor, one of the aims of the paper to provide an ecological account of scripts, to show that what cognitivists viewed as representations (or representational structures) are in fact environmentally structured perception-action loops. On our account of gender, gendered cultures build and maintain gendered cultural affordance landscapes, that is, landscapes in which the action possibilities individuals face are normed according to a specific body type or situation; most often (assigned) biological sex. Individuals enact a given gender when they come to perceive the affordances reserved for one gender by their culture and respond in the culturally normative way, thus enacting gendered sequences of perception-action loops (i.e., gendered scripts). With the shifting landscapes of cultural affordances brought about by several recent social, technological, and epistemic developments in some cultures, the gendered landscapes of affordances offered to individuals in these cultures have become more varied and less rigid, thus increasing the variety and flexibility of scripts individuals can enact. This entails that individuals in such cultures have an increased possibility for gender fluidity, which may in part explain the increasing number of people currently identifying outside the binary.

"I am feeling tension in my whole body": An experimental phenomenological study of empathy for pain.

Introduction: Traditionally, empathy has been studied from two main perspectives: the theory-theory approach and the simulation theory approach. These theories claim that social emotions are fundamentally constituted by mind states in the brain. In contrast, classical phenomenology and recent research based on the enactive theories consider empathy as the basic process of contacting others' emotional experiences through direct bodily perception and sensation. Objective: This study aims to enrich the knowledge of the empathic experience of pain using an experimental phenomenological method. Materials and methods: Implementing an experimental paradigm used in affective neuroscience, we exposed 28 healthy adults to a video of sportspersons suffering physical accidents while practicing extreme sports. Immediately after watching the video, each participant underwent a phenomenological interview to gather data on embodied, multi-layered dimensions (bodily sensations, emotions, and motivations) and temporal aspects of empathic experience. We also performed quantitative analyses of the phenomenological categories. Results: Experiential access to the other person's painful experience involves four main themes. Bodily resonance: participants felt a multiplicity of bodily, affective, and kinesthetic sensations in coordination with the sportsperson's bodily actions. Attentional focus: some participants centered their attention more on their own personal discomfort and sensations of rejection, while others on the pain and suffering experienced by the sportspersons. Kinesthetic motivation: some participants experienced the feeling in their bodies to avoid or escape from watching the video, while others experienced the need to help the sportspersons avoid suffering any injury while practicing extreme sports. The temporality of experience: participants witnessed temporal fluctuations in their experiences, bringing intensity changes in their bodily resonance, attentional focus, and kinesthetic motivation. Finally, two experiential structures were found: one structure is self-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the participant's own experience of seeing the sportsperson suffering, and self-protective kinesthetic motivation; the other structure is other-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the sportsperson, and prosocial kinesthetic motivation to help them. Discussion: We show how phenomenological data may contribute to comprehending empathy for pain in social neuroscience. In addition, we address the phenomenological aspect of the enactive approach to the three dimensions of an embodiment of human consciousness, especially the intersubjective dimension. Also, based on our results, we suggest an extension of the enactive theory of non-interactive social experience.

Embodiment in online psychotherapy: A qualitative study.

As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, many therapists and patients have been required to switch to online sessions in order to continue their treatments. Online psychotherapy has become increasingly popular, and although its efficacy seems to be similar to face-to-face encounters, its capacity to support the implicit nonverbal and embodied aspects of the therapeutic relationship has been questioned and remains understudied. OBJECTIVES: To study how embodied and intersubjective processes are modified in online psychotherapy sessions. DESIGN: Taking the enactive concept of participatory sense-making as a guiding thread, we designed an interpretative phenomenological analysis to examine the experiences of embodiment in online therapy. METHODS: We conducted phenomenological semi-structured interviews with patients and therapists who have recently switched from face-to-face encounters to online modality. RESULTS: Adjustments in verbal and nonverbal behavior, gaze behavior, management of silences, and displacements of non-intentional and pre-reflective patterns onto reflective ones are reported as necessary to compensate for changes introduced in the online modality. CONCLUSIONS: From an enactive perspective, such adaptations manifest regulatory processes aimed at sustaining interactive dynamics and coordinating the primordial tension between relational and individual norms in social encounters. PRACTITIONER POINTS: We examine different aspects of embodiment that practitioners should take into account when switching from face-to-face to online encounters with their clients. Online communication systems can alter aspects of the therapeutic relationship, such as its structure, its fragility, and its significance. Video calls afford new forms of intervention such as integrating the experience of patients with their self-image, incorporating information about their habitual environment into the process, and adopting less confrontational therapeutic styles.

Knowing Groundlessness: An Enactive Approach to a Shift From Cognition to Non-Dual Awareness.

The enactive approach has become an influential paradigm in cognitive science. One of its most important claims is that cognition is sense-making: to cognize is to enact a world of meaning. Thus, a world is not pregiven but enacted through sense-making. Most importantly, sense-making is not a fixed process or thing. It does not have substantial existence. Instead, it is groundless: it springs from a dynamic of relations, without substantial ground. Thereby, as all cognition is groundless, this groundlessness is considered the central underlying principle of cognition. This article takes that key concept of the enactive approach and argues that it is not only a theoretical statement. Rather, groundlessness is directly accessible in lived experience. The two guiding questions of this article concern that lived experience of groundlessness: (1) What is it to know groundlessness? (2) How can one know groundlessness? Accordingly, it elaborates (1) how this knowing of groundlessness fits into the theoretical framework of the enactive approach. Also, it describes (2) how it can be directly experienced when certain requirements are met. In an additional reflexive analysis, the context-dependency and observer-relativity of those statements themselves is highlighted. Through those steps, this article exhibits the importance of knowing groundlessness for a cognitive science discourse: this underlying groundlessness is not only the "ground" of cognition, but it also can be investigated empirically through lived experience. However, it requires a methodology that is radically different from classical cognitive science. This article ends with envisioning a future praxis of cognitive science which enables researchers to investigate not only theoretically but empirically the "foundationless foundation" of cognition: groundlessness.

Placebo From an Enactive Perspective.

Due to their complexity and variability, placebo effects remain controversial. We suggest this is also due to a set of problematic assumptions (dualism, reductionism, individualism, passivity). We critically assess current explanations and empirical evidence and propose an alternative theoretical framework-the enactive approach to life and mind-based on recent developments in embodied cognitive science. We review core enactive concepts such as autonomy, agency, and sense-making. Following these ideas, we propose a move from binary distinctions (e.g., conscious vs. non-conscious) to the more workable categories of reflective and pre-reflective activity. We introduce an ontology of individuation, following the work of Gilbert Simondon, that allow us to see placebo interventions not as originating causal chains, but as modulators and triggers in the regulation of tensions between ongoing embodied and interpersonal processes. We describe these interrelated processes involving looping effects through three intertwined dimensions of embodiment: organic, sensorimotor, and intersubjective. Finally, we defend the need to investigate therapeutic interactions in terms of participatory sense-making, going beyond the identification of individual social traits (e.g., empathy, trust) that contribute to placebo effects. We discuss resonances and differences between the enactive proposal, popular explanations such as expectations and conditioning, and other approaches based on meaning responses and phenomenological/ecological ideas.

Algorithmic injustice: a relational ethics approach.

It has become trivial to point out that algorithmic systems increasingly pervade the social sphere. Improved efficiency-the hallmark of these systems-drives their mass integration into day-to-day life. However, as a robust body of research in the area of algorithmic injustice shows, algorithmic systems, especially when used to sort and predict social outcomes, are not only inadequate but also perpetuate harm. In particular, a persistent and recurrent trend within the literature indicates that society's most vulnerable are disproportionally impacted. When algorithmic injustice and harm are brought to the fore, most of the solutions on offer (1) revolve around technical solutions and (2) do not center disproportionally impacted communities. This paper proposes a fundamental shift-from rational to relational-in thinking about personhood, data, justice, and everything in between, and places ethics as something that goes above and beyond technical solutions. Outlining the idea of ethics built on the foundations of relationality, this paper calls for a rethinking of justice and ethics as a set of broad, contingent, and fluid concepts and down-to-earth practices that are best viewed as a habit and not a mere methodology for data science. As such, this paper mainly offers critical examinations and reflection and not "solutions."